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Public-key certiﬁcates allow a multitude of entities to securely exchange and verify the
authenticity of data. However, the ability to effectively revoke compromised or untrust-
worthy certiﬁcates is of great importance when coping with misbehavior. In this paper,
we design a fully distributed local certiﬁcate revocation scheme for ephemeral networks
– a class of extremely volatile wireless networks with short-duration and short-range com-
munications – based on a game-theoretic approach. First, by providing incentives, we can
guarantee the successful revocation of the malicious nodes even if they collude. Second,
thanks to the records of past behavior, we dynamically adapt the parameters to nodes’ rep-
utations and establish the optimal Nash equilibrium (NE) on-the-ﬂy, minimizing the social
cost of the revocation. Third, based on the analytical results, we deﬁne OREN, a unique opti-
mal NE selection protocol, and evaluate its performance through simulations. We show
that our scheme is effective in quickly and efﬁciently removing malicious devices from
the network.
 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The emerging availability of wireless devices able to
communicate directly with other peers is opening new
ways for people to interact and exchange information
[1–3]. The absence of a centrally-managed infrastructure,
however, makes it harder to cope with misbehavior. In
the literature, a considerable effort is being devoted to
the analysis of security mechanisms performed by self-
interested agents [4,5]. In particular, the revocation of
compromised public-key certiﬁcates is a very important
primitive for environments where authentication is
required.
In ephemeral networks, the short-lived and heteroge-
neous contacts among nodes (potentially unbeknownst to
each other) make it imperative to address the revocation
issue in a distributed and efﬁcient way. One step in this. All rights reserved.
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grevic), hossein.man-
com (M. Raya), jean-direction has been taken by Raya et al. [6] through their
game-theoretic local certiﬁcate revocation protocol Revo-
Game. Their model, however, has some limitations. First,
it is often difﬁcult to obtain correct estimates of crucial
parameters very frequently and thus the outcome of the
revocation could be unpredictable. Second, the dynamic
kind of games used by their model assumes that each node
can observe the actions of the others before taking its own
decision, which is not always be feasible in ephemeral
environments. For example, the duration of the related
public-key operations, such as signature veriﬁcation and
generation, might take an excessive amount of time.
In this paper, we design a substantially improved and
extended local certiﬁcate revocation framework for
ephemeral networks. With respect to [6], our contribution
is fourfold. First of all, we consider revocations in which
nodes take actions simultaneously, i.e. they do not know
others’ decisions before taking their own, as it might take
too much time in practice and the nodes might have al-
ready lost contact. Second, we provide incentives that
stimulate participation and guarantee a successful
revocation of malicious nodes even when they collude or
when the parameter estimations are difﬁcult. Third, by
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tion, we are able to allow for personalized and dynamic
costs that depend on the behavior of each node in past
games. Fourth, as each device could potentially have a dif-
ferent reputation, we design a fully distributed on-the-ﬂy
NE selection protocol, OREN, that establishes, if more than
one NE exist, the best course of action for each player with
the least social cost. Simulation results ﬁnally show that
our analytical framework is effective in removing the mis-
behaving nodes’ certiﬁcates through the socially optimal
NE of the revocation game.
The paper is organized as follows. After discussing the
related work in Section 2, we present our system model
in Section 3. We describe the revocation process in Section
4 and we perform the game theoretic analysis in Section 5.
We devote Section 6 to the design of the socially optimal
Nash equilibrium selection protocol OREN and we evaluate
its performance through simulations in Section 7. We con-
clude the paper in Section 8.2. Related work
Li et al. [7] propose a key management model based on
a web of trust, where nodes sign each other’s certiﬁcates
without any trusted third party. Revocation is performed
by a single node that broadcasts the revocation request
to all two-hop neighbors, who then add the accused node’s
certiﬁcate to their blacklists. However, the communication
overhead related to blacklist exchange and the trust
assumptions derived from indirect chains of certiﬁcates
could lead to security compromises when dealing with
nodes without previous ﬁrst-hand knowledge. A ‘‘virtual’’
CA is envisaged by Luo et al. [8], where no single node is
trusted to issue certiﬁcates on its own, but any k trusted
nodes together are allowed to issue and revoke certiﬁcates.
Assuming a system-wide ﬁxed value for k, new nodes
wishing to enter the network are forced to migrate in
places where at least k already trusted devices are willing
to sign the public/private key pair of the newcomer.
Chinni et al. [9] propose a hierarchical trust model
where a trusted third party (CA) is responsible for the gen-
eration of public-key certiﬁcates but revocation is dele-
gated to nodes. The authors suggest a method to deal
with misbehaving devices by minimizing their trust level
among the neighbors based on the quality of service they
provide but, at the same time, they allow the trust to be re-
gained and therefore the certiﬁcate renewal interval can be
extended. Similarly, Arboit et al. [10] perform a game-the-
oretic security analysis and compute a trust threshold va-
lue by taking into account the reputations of both the
accused and accusing nodes. An accusation made by a node
with a low reputation, i.e. a node that has many pending
accusations on itself, has a lower weight than the accusa-
tion by a node with a higher reputation (with fewer pend-
ing accusations). A revocation is successful if the sum of
weighted accusations is greater than a threshold value,
and the revoked certiﬁcate is completely useless for further
interactions.
Reputation mechanisms and their applications in mo-
bile ad hoc networks have also been studied by Michiardiand Molva [11]. Their CORE reputation scheme naturally
excludes nodes from the network, if they do not contribute
to its functioning, by lowering their reputations, whereas
cooperating nodes can operate and request more services,
as their reputation is increased for every service their pro-
vide to the community.
In [6], Raya et al. take a game-theoretic approach for
certiﬁcate revocations in ephemeral networks by extend-
ing the possibility of revocation just by a single node’s
decision, in addition to the aggregate voting scheme. The
interactions among the well-behaving nodes are visible
to all of them as the game model is a dynamic complete
information game. As stated in Section 1, the estimation
of several game parameters, such as the number of detec-
tors and the number of required voters, coupled with the
sequential strategic behavior, are some of the limiting fac-
tors addressed in this work. Incentives for revocations in
ad hoc networks are analyzed by Reidt et al. [12], although
only the self-sacriﬁce of one node could lead to the revoca-
tion of a malicious node’s certiﬁcate.3. System model
We consider an ephemeral network with short-dura-
tion (1–10 s), short-range (10–100 m) contacts that can
take place both in licensed and unlicensed frequency
bands. We only require the wireless devices to be able to
establish direct communication among themselves.
Furthermore, we assume that all devices are powerful
enough to run public-key cryptographic algorithms. This
assumption is based on the evidence that most of today’s
smartphones (and future cell phones [13]) have integrated
public-key certiﬁcates for connecting to secure HTTPS
servers on the Internet or for authenticating themselves
on protected enterprise IEEE 802.11 WLAN networks.
We consider that a trusted third party (or parties) exists
in such networks and that each mobile node is pre-loaded
with public-key certiﬁcates issued by a CA, that are used
both for periodically advertising their presence (by broad-
casting a signed beacon message) and for signing all sent
messages. In order to allow for integrity and authenticity
checks, we assume that only signed messages will be con-
sidered. The unique certiﬁcate serial number [14] serves as
a unique ID that distinguishes each device in a given revo-
cation process. We also assume that each node has more
than one certiﬁcate in the initial deployment phase, in or-
der to allow for location privacy protection and to avoid
the possibility of being tracked and identiﬁed over time
[15,16].3.1. Certiﬁcate management
We assume that each node i has a reserve Ri containing
all valid certiﬁcates, a counter ui which measures the num-
ber of valid certiﬁcates within Ri that can be used for revo-
cations, and a tamper-resistant device, such as a smart-card,
where the revocation protocols are executed. The counter
and reserve can be updated and signed either by a CA or
by the tamper-resistant device but not by the node itself.
Fig. 1. Example scenario of a certiﬁcate update by the CA. Device i buys some certiﬁcates (step 1) and the CA only updates its reserve (step 2). Device i, after
having actively participated in a revocation process, sends its revocation report to the CA (step 3), which updates both i’s counter ui and reserve (step 4).
Note that the CA sets the system parameter M/N based on periodic malicious behavior statistics, gathered by the law enforcement authorities.
1 By active we mean nodes that have either voted or committed self-
sacriﬁce in the revocation process.
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ways-on connection with the central authority, but we
do assume that nodes will reconnect with the CA sporadi-
cally (from every few hours to every few days) through a
direct connection or a pre-deployed infrastructure man-
aged by the CA. During the successive connections, the
CA will renew nodes’ credentials by updating the counter
ui and/or reserve Ri, after having veriﬁed their past behav-
ior in an appropriate way (e.g., the judgment system pre-
sented in [12]).
Nodes can thus obtain valid certiﬁcates by either (a)
buying them from the CA (Fig. 1, step 1 and 2) or (b) by
revoking malicious nodes, as a reward for the useful ser-
vice provided to the community (Fig. 1, step 3 and 4). Note
that when buying certiﬁcates, only the reserve is updated
by the CA with new certiﬁcates for location privacy protec-
tion (+pseudo), whereas by revoking malicious devices,
both reserve and counter are updated by the same amount
(+counter). By deﬁnition, the level of the reserve cannot be
lower than the counter and when the former reaches the
latter (due to frequent pseudonym changes for instance),
a node would have to renew its certiﬁcates in order to con-
tinue ensuring its location privacy. When a revocation oc-
curs, the revocation protocol updates the values of Ri and
ui in all participating nodes by using the tamper-resistant
device. This will be discussed in more detail when we de-
ﬁne our revocation protocol in Sections 4 and 5.
It is clear that the logistic costs associated with the cer-
tiﬁcate management (by the CA) and frequent pseudonym
changes (by the nodes) could make the limited reserve of
valid certiﬁcates a critical resource.3.2. Threat model
The attacker could potentially be any wireless device
with exactly the same characteristics as the other benign
nodes. Examples of misbehavior include, for instance, dis-
seminating false information in the network, sending
undesired advertisements or hijacking other nodes with
the intent to subvert them to the attacker’s advantage.
We assume that multiple attackers can also collude in or-
der to revoke benign nodes.4. Revocation process
The revocation procedure begins when a node detects
the presence of a misbehaving peer (node m) and decides
to accuse it. Note that for each accused node m, there is
one revocation process and each node can participate in
at most one at any given time, even though there could
be many processes running in parallel. For simplicity and
without loss of generality, in this paper we consider one
revocation only. Moreover, we focus on the reaction [17]
of a set of nodes once a malicious node has already been
detected, rather than on the detection mechanism itself.
References on the latter aspect can be found in [18,19].
The action that each device can take in a revocation pro-
cess is either abstain, vote or commit self-sacriﬁce. By
abstaining, the node does not take any active1 role but
Table 1
List of symbols.
Symbol Deﬁnition
N Total number of nodes in comm. range
(benign + malicious)
M Number of malicious nodes in comm. range
Ri Reserve of valid certiﬁcates of node i
b Beneﬁt for voting
B Beneﬁt for self-sacriﬁcing
c Cost of non revocation of malicious node
C s,i Cost of self-sacriﬁcing for player i
f (M/N) Risk of attack by colluding malicious nodes for self-
sacriﬁcing
e (M/N) Risk of attack by colluding malicious nodes for voting
k If successful revocation k = 1, otherwise k = 0
m Subscript used for the malicious node
nv Number of votes required for the revocation
ui Counter of player i’s valid certiﬁcates for revocations
v Cost of voting
c(si) Sum of counters of players (other than i)that vote
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node from the network. Voting against the incriminated
node is decisive but a single vote is usually not sufﬁcient
for a successful revocation. There should be at least nv votes
in order to perform the revocation. The determination of this
important parameter is performed in Section 5.2. Yet
another possibility is obtained by allowing a single node to
entirely revoke the certiﬁcate of the misbehaving node
[20]. At the same time, however, the node performing the
revocation has to sacriﬁce a considerable amount of its
own certiﬁcates as well, in order to limit abuses. We call this
powerful but expensive strategy the self-sacriﬁce. We devote
Section 5.4 to the ﬁne tuning of the self-sacriﬁce cost
function.
The sequence of events encountered in each revocation
process is shown in Fig. 2 and described hereafter. We as-
sume that there is a set of N = n +M nodes in communica-
tion range, where n is the number of benign nodes andM is
the number of estimated malicious ones. M could also rep-
resent the estimated power of the colluding attackers, and
in this case M/N could be set by the CA to a high value in
case of a conservative attitude and repeated collusion at-
tacks by malicious nodes. For instance, statistics on nodes’
behavior (gathered periodically by the law enforcement
authorities) can be used by the CA to set the M/N value
according to the expected power of colluding attackers.
In the set n of benign nodes there is one device, called ini-
tiator, that broadcasts (1) the revocation request against an
accused node m, (2) its signed counter, (3) the attack-in-
duced cost parameter c and (4) the parameter M/N (signed
by the CA) to all peers, called participants, that are in com-
munication range with both the initiator and the accused
node. The participants respond to the request by broad-
casting their own signed counters, such that all parties
are aware of the respective amounts of valid certiﬁcates.
When the accused node receives the revocation request
against it, a signed message containing its own counter is
generated by its tamper-resistant module and broadcast
as well. Once all the n benign nodes have complete knowl-
edge of each others’ counters and M, they do not need to
communicate anymore and the off-line distributed revoca-
tion process (described in Section 6) begins. Our protocols
then deﬁne the unique outcome and the individual actions
for all devices.
In order to prevent any abuse of benign nodes and
encourage participation in revocations against maliciousFig. 2. Revocation process sequence of events: ﬁrst, the initiator broad-
casts the accusation and his signed counter and then participants and
accused node broadcast their own counters.devices, we need to assign costs and beneﬁts for every ac-
tion performed by a participant in any revocation
procedure (Table 1). We express these in number of certif-
icates because they are a vital (required to sign messages)
and limited resource in our network. For instance, we as-
sume that for any participant i, casting a vote has a cost
of v + e (M/N), where vP 0 is a fraction of the counter set
by the CA and e (M/N)P 0 is a function that represents
the risk of a retaliation attack by colluding malicious peers
against a node that chooses to cast a vote. Similarly, a self-
sacriﬁce costs cs,i + f(M/N), where cs,iP 0 is the individual
cost for the self-sacriﬁce action and f(M/N)P 0 is a func-
tion that models the risk of a retaliation attack by colluding
malicious peers against a node that performs a self-sacri-
ﬁce. The two collusion risk functions are characterized in
Section 5.3.
If the revocation is successful, the CA provides rewards
for voting and committing self-sacriﬁce, which are b and B,
respectively. The abstain strategy, on the contrary, does
not have a cost or beneﬁt because it does not contribute
the revocation. If the revocation is not successful, the ben-
eﬁts are not distributed. Moreover, a failed attempt and the
wasted effort of the community is computed by adding the
attack-induced cost value c for all participants, which is
estimated by the initiator and broadcast together with
the revocation request at the beginning of the process.
After each revocation procedure, a report – containing
all the unique IDs of nodes involved in the process together
with the associated action – is compiled by all nodes and
stored. At the next possible occasion, each participating
node sends the report to the CA who then veriﬁes, in a suit-
able way, the past behavior of the accused node and deci-
des whether to permanently revoke the certiﬁcate or not.
In case the accusation was unfunded, the CA can also pun-
ish nodes that have disseminated false accusations. Finally,
depending on the action taken by each device, the CA re-
wards the participants with fresh certiﬁcates and updates
the reserves and counters, which then enable the partici-
pants to continue operating in the network.
Clearly, if a device is seldom required to participate in
revocation procedures, its counter does not evolve as
Table 2
Payoff ui of player i after the end of a revocation game, given the strategy si.
If the revocation was successful, we have k = 1 and otherwise k = 0.
Abstain Self-sacriﬁce Vote
Cost (1  k)  c cs,i + f(M/N) v + e (M/N) + (1  k)  c
Beneﬁt 0 B k  b
Payoff ui (1  k)  c B  cs,i 
f (M/N)
k  b  v 
e (M/N)  (l  k)  c
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does not need to renew its credentials due to revocations.
However, all nodes will have to periodically renew their
certiﬁcates when the level of the reserve reaches the value
of the counter, in order to prevent eavesdroppers from
tracking their location.
Although the revocation protocols are run in a tamper-
resistant device and certiﬁcates are updated by a CA, there
could still be several possible combinations of actions by
which each revocation procedure might end. Moreover,
as the costs for each node depend both on the individual
action (performed by that node) and on the outcome of
the revocation itself (whether the accused node is revoked
or not), a game-theoretic framework is well adapted to
model and analyze such strategic situations. Furthermore,
if more than one solution exists, game theory provides
means for all parties to converge to the socially optimal
one, which maximizes the aggregated beneﬁts of the com-
munity of nodes. Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to the appli-
cation of game theory to local revocations.5. Game-theoretic analysis
In this section, we present our game-theoretic frame-
work and the analytical results. First, we consider revoca-
tion games where payoffs depend on the current
strategies and game outcome only. Afterwards, we extend
the framework to include nodes’ past behavior in the com-
putations of payoffs, strategies and outcomes by consider-
ing the counter as the indicator of a node’s reputation.
We deﬁne a non-cooperative static revocation game as
Gn ¼ fP;S;Ug, where P ¼ fPigni¼1 is the set of the nwireless
players as described in Section 3, S ¼ fSigni¼1 is the strategy
set and U ¼ fuigni¼1 the payoff set. Moreover, we assume
the game to be of complete information, i.e. every node
has complete knowledge about the payoff functions and
the counters of all participants. This assumption is based
on the fact that the game parameters are either deﬁned
in advance on a system-level scale or they are completely
deﬁned by the information exchanged during the revoca-
tion process itself. More often than not, security decisions
are made on implicit assumptions about the strength of
the attacker, but here we need to commensurate the re-
sponse of benign players to quantitative values of the cur-
rent costs and beneﬁts of the game. Therefore, we assume
such values to be known to all participants before the ac-
tual game takes place.
Strategies. The strategies available for each player i are
either abstain (A), vote (V), or commit self-sacriﬁce (S). Each
strategy has an associated beneﬁt and cost that depends on
the successful or unsuccessful revocation of the certiﬁcate
as well.
Payoffs. The payoff function ui of player i is deﬁned as
the difference between beneﬁts and costs, expressed in
public-key certiﬁcates and is shown in Table 2.
The quantity of valid certiﬁcates, available for revoca-
tion purposes, is deﬁned as ui for each player i, whereas
the accused node m has um. According to Section 3, we re-
fer to it as the counter, which is updated after each game as
the sum of the previous value of the counter and thecurrent payoff, i.e. ui  ui þ ui, such that it is accumu-
lated over time. The evolution of ui depends therefore on
the way nodes participate in revocation games and on their
past behavior.
Game solutions. A widely adopted solution concept in
game theory is the Nash equilibrium (NE), a strategy set
s ¼ fsi gni¼1 from which no node has incentive to unilater-
ally deviate, given that all other players conform to it. In
this paper, we focus on Nash equilibria as the rational out-
come for any revocation game Gn. Although computing any
NE is PPAD hard [21], the ﬁne tuning performed in Section
5.4 allows nodes to substantially reduce the number of
such computations by considering only efﬁcient strategy
proﬁles that result in a successful revocation.
5.1. Revocations with Payoffs
Let Gfn be an n-player revocation game, where beneﬁt
and cost values of Table 2 are ﬁxed for all players (cs,i = cs).
Initially, we assume that the number of votes required to
revoke a certiﬁcate is a ﬁxed value nv. We now establish
the solutions of Gfn by means of the NE strategies which de-
ﬁne, for each player, the strategy to adopt in order to
achieve the desired outcome.
Lemma 1. In Gfn, for (B = cs) ^ (b > v), the n-player static
game Gn has a unique pure strategy NE proﬁle s* = (V, . . . ,V),
i.e. all players vote and the accused node is revoked.Proof. By deﬁnition, we know that a strategy proﬁle s is a
NE iff no single player has incentive to unilaterally deviate
from his equilibrium strategy si , given the strategies of
other players si. If we consider the payoff for any player
i corresponding to the strategy proﬁle s* = (V, . . . ,V) we
have that
si ¼ A uiðV ; . . . ;A;V ; . . . ;VÞ ¼ 0;
si ¼ V uiðV ; . . . ;V ; . . . ;VÞ ¼ b v  eðM=NÞ;
si ¼ S uiðV ; . . . ; S;V ; . . . ;VÞ ¼ B cs  f ðM=NÞ:
Given the conditions of the Lemma, b  v  e (M/N) >
0  f(M/N) and thus for any si – si , the corresponding pay-
off is lower than if si ¼ si . h
Intuitively, as the payoff for voting is strictly greater
than for self-sacriﬁcing, all players are better off voting
and revoking the certiﬁcate.
Lemma 2. In Gfn, for (B = cs) ^ (b < v), if f(M/N) < c then the
NE are all strategy proﬁles s* that have exactly one self-
sacriﬁce and n  1 abstentions. If f(M/N)P c, then the
strategy proﬁle all-abstain is a NE.
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sacriﬁce and n  1 abstentions. In this case, the payoffs
are u = (B  cs  f(M/N),0, . . . ,0) = (f(M/N), . . . ,0), where
the self-sacriﬁcing player i could be any of the n players.
The payoffs are
if si ¼ S : uiðA; . . . ; si ;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ 0 f ðM=NÞ;
uiðA; . . . ;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ c;
uiðA; . . . ;V ;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ v  eðM=NÞ  c;
if si ¼ A : uiðS;A . . . ; si ; . . . ;AÞ ¼ 0;
uiðS;A; . . . ;V ;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ b v  eðM=NÞ;
uiðS;A . . . ; S;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ 0 f ðM=NÞ:
For si ¼ S; uiðA; . . . ;AÞ ¼ c < uiðsi ;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ f ðM=NÞ if
and only if f(M/N) < c. For si ¼ A; uiðS;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼
0 > uiðS;A; . . . ; S;A; . . .;AÞ ¼ f ðM=NÞ for all f(M/N) > 0.
We see that if player i is the only sacriﬁcing participant,
he has no incentive to deviate from this strategy if the risk
of retaliation is low (f(M/N) < c). In this case, any strategy
proﬁle s* with exactly one self-sacriﬁce and n  1 absten-
tions is a NE. If, on the other hand, the risk of retaliation is
high, he would prefer to abstain and thus the all-abstain
strategy proﬁle would be a NE. h
In other words, if the risk of retaliation by colluding
malicious nodes is higher than the attack induced cost,
then the benign nodes would prefer not to revoke the mis-
behaving device.
Lemma 3. In Gfn, for [(B < cs) ^ (b < v)] ^ [B  cs  f(M/
N) > b  v  e(M/N)], if f(M/N) < B  cs + c then the NE are
all strategy proﬁles that have exactly one self-sacriﬁce and
n  1 abstentions. If f(M/N) > B  cs + c then the strategy
proﬁle all-abstain is a NE.Proof. Similar to Lemma 2, we consider the strategy pro-
ﬁle s* with one self-sacriﬁce and n  1 abstentions. The
payoffs are u = (B  cs  f(M/N),0, . . . ,0), where the self-
sacriﬁcing player i could be any of the n players. Then
if si ¼ S : uiðA; . . . ; si ;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ B cs  f ðM=NÞ;
uiðA; . . . ;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ c;
uiðA; . . . ;V ;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ v  eðM=NÞ  c;
if si ¼ A : uiðS;A . . . ; si ; . . . ;AÞ ¼ 0;
uiðS;A; . . . ;V ;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ b v  eðM=NÞ;
uiðS;A . . . ; S;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ B cs  f ðM=NÞ:
For si ¼ S; uiðA; . . . ;AÞ ¼ c < uiðsi ;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ B cs
f ðM=NÞ if and only if f(M/N) < B  cs + c. For si ¼ A;
uiðS;A; . . . ; AÞ ¼ 0 > uiðS;A; . . . ; S;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ B cs f ðM=NÞ
for all f(M/N) > B  cs, which is always the case, assuming
B < cs. The Lemma follows. h
Even though both payoffs are negative, if self-sacriﬁcing
is still better than voting and the retaliation risk is con-
tained, then the revocation is performed by only one
player, because it is in the best interest of all other players
to avoid wasting certiﬁcates and thus to abstain.
Lemma 4. In Gfn, for [(B < cs) ^ (b < v)] ^ [b  v  e(M/
N) > B  cs  f(M/N)], if e(M/N) < b  v + c then the NE areall strategy proﬁles that have (a) one self-sacriﬁce with n  1
abstentions and (b) nv votes with n  nv abstentions. If e(M/
N)P b  v + c then (b) is not anymore a NE. The accused node
is revoked by any NE.Proof. For the case (a), the proof is analogous to the one of
Lemma 2. For the case (b), we consider the strategy proﬁle
s* that has exactly nv votes and n  nv abstentions. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the ﬁrst nv players vote
and the remaining players abstain. We refer to a voting
player as i and to an abstaining player as j.
If s1 ¼ V : u1ðs1; . . . ;V ;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ b v  eðM=NÞ;
u1ðA;V ; . . . ;V ;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ c;
u1ðS;V ; . . . ;V ;A; . . . ;AÞ ¼ B cs  f ðM=NÞ;
If sn ¼ A : u1ðV ; . . . ;V ;A; . . . ; snÞ ¼ 0;
unðV ; . . . ;V ;A; . . . ;VÞ ¼ b v  eðM=NÞ;
unðV ; . . . ;V ;A; . . . ; SÞ ¼ B cs  f ðM=NÞ:
According to the conditions of the Lemma, we have that
si = V is better than si = S for any voting player i. Similarly,
we see that si = V is also better than si = A if and only if
b  v  e (M/N) >c, or if e (M/N) < b  v + c. Moreover,
sj = A is better than sj = V or sj = S for any abstaining player
j. Therefore, the strategy proﬁle s* with exactly nv votes
and n  nv abstentions is a NE if and only if e (M/
N) < b  v  c, otherwise s* is not a NE. h
Intuitively, if the risk of retaliation for a voting node is
contained, the revocation could also be performed by the
strict minimum number of voters nv, without any self-sac-
riﬁce. If the risk is higher, then no voting strategy proﬁle is
a NE.
Most of the NE deﬁned by the precedent lemmas guar-
antee the revocation of the accused node’s certiﬁcate.
However, when costs are greater than beneﬁts, the rational
strategies do not predict any unnecessary waste of valid
certiﬁcates by the players. Only the strict minimal number
of voters nv or exactly one self-sacriﬁce is selected as NE of
the game. The main drawback is, however, that in all cases
we have more than one possible NE by which the game
could end. If active players bear a positive cost, those
who abstain beneﬁt from the effort of the others without
having to pay for it. Thus, every node would prefer to be
one of the abstaining players and enjoy the beneﬁts with-
out contributing to the well-being of the community. The
decision about which player should choose which strategy
is addressed in the following subsections, by taking into
account the past behavior of each node when computing
individual payoffs. We ﬁrst discuss the number of votes
nv and then we focus on self-sacriﬁce costs cs,i.
5.2. Dynamic vote
Previously, we assumed that nv was a ﬁxed value, e.g.
the majority of players, as we did not consider reputations.
By accounting for past behavior, however, we can deter-
mine the number of necessary votes for a successful revo-
cation depending on the device that actually uses the vote
strategy and the reputation of the accused node. For in-
stance, one vote by a node with a higher reputation than
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certiﬁcate (thus nv = 1), whereas several nodes might need
to vote if their counter is not greater than the one of the ac-
cused device (nv > 1).
We now assume that a revocation is successful when (a)P
i:si¼Vu

i P u

m, i.e. if the sum of counters of the players that
vote is greater than the accused node’s counter, or when (b)
there is at least one self-sacriﬁcing player. We see that, for
any given strategy proﬁle s ¼ fsigni¼1, the actual reputation
of the nodes performing the vote strategy determines nv.
For simplicity of future notation, for each strategy proﬁle
si = (s1, . . . ,si1,si+1, . . . ,sn), we deﬁne the sum of counters
of all players k (other than i) that choose to vote as
cðsiÞ ¼
X
k–i:sk¼V
uk :5.3. Retaliation attack cost functions
For each revocation game against a malicious node,
there is a risk that the accused nodes might collude and/
or respond to the revocation by accusing the benign nodes.
The more malicious nodes are present in a given area, the
more costly (or risky) it becomes for benign nodes to re-
voke them. Each participant in the revocation game has
two decisive actions (vote or commit self-sacriﬁce) that
have different strengths: one vote is usually not sufﬁcient
for a revocation, as opposed to one self-sacriﬁce which is
entirely sufﬁcient. Thus, the self-sacriﬁce strategy is more
risky to adopt because it is very easy for the malicious
nodes to identify the unique player that committed self-
sacriﬁce and retaliate against it. Therefore, we assume that
0 < e (M/N) < f(M/N).
We choose f(M/N) =M/N and e (M/N) = z M/N, 0 < z 1,
to model the retaliation attack cost functions in our games.
They assure that in each revocation game, if M/N is high,
the nodes will carefully consider their actions before com-
mitting to them.5.4. Self-sacriﬁce cost function
If we consider the self-sacriﬁce strategy, we know that
only one such strategy is sufﬁcient to revoke the accused
node. Thus, the extreme power associated with its use
should depend on the past behavior of each node. We
make the plausible assumption that a node with a high
counter has most likely behaved correctly in the past and
did not abuse the revocations, whereas a node with a low
counter has probably misbehaved. The well-behaving node
has a better reputation and should be given a greater
incentive to perform the self-sacriﬁce. The misbehaving
node should have to pay an extremely high price for self-
sacriﬁcing, which would ultimately deplete its counter
and remove it automatically from the network. This would
limit the abuse and ensure that misbehavior is quickly
extinguished.
We model the self-sacriﬁce cost cs,i by a linear function
of the counter ui , i.e. cs;i ¼ h g  ui . We tested several
concave and convex functions for which the cost decreases
monotonically with the counter. We chose the linearmodel because it provides a good balance between the
higher costs determined by a concave function and the
lower costs dictated by a convex one. The two parameters
of cs,i to ﬁne tune are h > 0 and g > 0. We begin by delineat-
ing the best response functions for a player i, assuming that
b  v  e (M/N) >c, i.e. the payoff for a successful vote is
greater than the cost of abstaining in case the accused node
is not revoked. The NE proﬁles are then obtained by the set
of mutual best responses. The following lemmas deﬁne the
scenarios where (1) the revocation does not succeed even if
i votes, (2) the revocation succeeds if i votes and (3) the
revocation succeeds even if i abstains.
Lemma 5. If si is such that ui þ cðsiÞ < um and in absence
of a self-sacriﬁce, the best response function for any player i is
deﬁned as
briðsiÞ ¼ arg max
si2fA;V ;Sg
uiðsi; siÞ ¼
A if ui < s1;
S otherwise;

where s1 ¼ hBcþf ðM=NÞg .
Proof. We look at the payoff functions for the different
possible si, given all si that respect the condition of the
lemma.
si ¼ A uiðA; siÞ ¼ c;
si ¼ V uiðV ; siÞ ¼ c  v  eðM=NÞ;
si ¼ S uiðS; siÞ ¼ B hþ g  ui  f ðM=NÞ:
From the above equations we know that the strategy vote
will never be a best response since the associated payoff
is always lower than the one given by abstain. The only
choice is then between the strategy S and A. Solving the
inequality B hþ g  ui  f ðM=NÞ > c we have that the
best response of player i is to abstain if ui <
hcBþf ðM=NÞ
g
and to self-sacriﬁce otherwise. hLemma 6. If si is such that ui þ cðsiÞP um and in absence
of a self-sacriﬁce, the best response function for any player i is
deﬁned as
briðsiÞ ¼
V if ui < s2;
S otherwise;

where s2 ¼ hBvþbeðM=NÞþf ðM=NÞg .
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one of Lemma 5. hLemma 7. If si is such that cðsiÞP um or it has at least one
self-sacriﬁce, the best response function for any player i is
deﬁned as
briðsiÞ ¼
A if b v < eðM=NÞ ^ ui < s3;
V if b v > eðM=NÞ ^ ui < s2;
S if ðb v < eðM=NÞ ^ ui P s3Þ;
[ðb v > eðM=NÞ ^ ui P s2Þ;
8>><
>>:
where s3 ¼ hBþf ðM=NÞg .
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Thanks to the best response functions, we can already
ﬁne tune h such that min(s1,s2) > 0 as ui P 0, which yields
h > B + c  f(M/N). In addition, we are now able to impose
the following three conditions on the game parameters:
(1) Positive cost. We want that cs,i + f(M/N) > 0 for all
players Pi, otherwise it would encourage the abuse
of self-sacriﬁce by malicious against benign nodes.cs;i ¼ h g  ui þ f ðM=NÞ > 0; 8i ¼ 1 . . . ;n;
which is equivalent tocs;i ¼ h g max
i
ui þ f ðM=NÞ > 0;
hþ f ðM=NÞ
maxiui
> g:
ð1Þ(2) Guaranteed revocation. Considering si of Lemma 5,
we do not want abstain to be a best response for at
least one player, otherwise the accused node would
not be revoked. In other terms, we need thatmax
i
ui >
h B c þ f ðM=NÞ
g
;
g >
h B c þ f ðM=NÞ
maxiui
:
ð2Þ
This requirement is essential if we want to protect
ourselves in case the estimation of the cost parame-
ters associated with the attack of the accused node is
difﬁcult or prone to errors.(3) System-wide efﬁciency. Considering si of Lemma 7,
we do not want self-sacriﬁce to be a best response.
The malicious node would be revoked anyway, even
if i abstains (and thus does not incur in any costs).
We can guarantee this by setting the largest thresh-
old of the game lower than the maximum counter.
(a) If b  v < e(M/N):max
i
ui < s3;
g <
h Bþ f ðM=NÞ
maxiui
¼ s4:
ð3Þ
(b) If b  vP e(M/N):
max
i
ui < s2;
g <
h B v þ b eðM=NÞ þ f ðM=NÞ
maxiui
¼ s5:
ð4ÞBy merging the upper bounds (1), (3), (4) and the lower
bound (2) we have.
 if b  v < e(M/N):
h B c þ f ðM=NÞ
maxiui
< g < s4; if b  vP e(M/N):
h B c þ f ðM=NÞ
maxiui
< g < s5:In addition to the conditions (1)–(3) expressed previ-
ously, in the NE selection protocol OREN deﬁned in Sec-
tion 6 we require the existence of at least one NE
strategy proﬁle. Thanks to bounds on the cost parameters
h and g, we state the following Theorem for b  v < e(M/
N) (when b  v > e(M/N), the solution is trivial because
there is always a unique NE, according to Lemma 1):
Theorem 1. In Gn, for b  v < e(M/N), there is always a pure
strategy NE proﬁle s* with exactly one self-sacriﬁce and n  1
abstentions. Moreover, the player that commits self-sacriﬁce
is the one with the largest ui .
Proof. Let us consider the strategy proﬁle s* =
(A, . . . ,A,S,A, . . . ,A), where the only S strategy is adopted
by the player with the largest ui (we call him PS) and all
the remaining n  1 players adopt the strategy abstain
(we refer to any of these players as PA). Using the bounds
found in Section 5.4 for h and g, we show that s* is always
a NE.
First, let us analyze the individual payoffs for each
player and for all his possible strategies, given the strat-
egies of the other n  1 players.
(a) For any PA:uPA ;ðA; siÞ ¼ uPA ;ðA;siÞ ¼ 0;
uPA ;ðV ; siÞ ¼ uPA ;ðV ;siÞ ¼ b v  eðM=NÞ;
uPA ;ðS; siÞ ¼ uPA ;ðS;siÞ ¼ B cs;PA  f ðM=NÞ:Here, we can already exclude the second possibility as the
corresponding payoff is always smaller than the other two.
Moreover, we can see thatuPA ;ðS;siÞ  uPA ;ðA;siÞ
¼ B cs;PA  f ðM=NÞ<
ðaÞ
B hþ h Bþ f ðM=NÞ
maxiui
 uPA
 f ðM=NÞ ¼ 1 u

PA
maxiui
 
ðB h f ðM=NÞÞ
<
ðbÞ
1 u

PA
maxiui
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}>0ðB B c þ f ðM=NÞ  f ðM=NÞÞ
¼ 1 u

PA
maxiui
 
ðcÞ < 0! uPA ;ðS;siÞ < uPA ;ðA;siÞ;where (a) follows from the lower bound (3) and (b) from
the ﬁne tuning of h, i.e. h > B + c  f(M/N). Therefore, no
player PA has incentive to unilaterally deviate from his
equilibrium strategy abstain.
(b) For PS, where uPS ¼maxiui :
uPS ;ðA; siÞ ¼ uPS ;ðA;siÞ ¼ c;
uPS ;ðV ; siÞ ¼ uPS ;ðV ;siÞ ¼ c  v  eðM=NÞ;
uPS ;ðS; siÞ ¼ uPS ;ðS;siÞ ¼ B cs;PS  f ðM=NÞ:Again, to vote is not an option for PS since the strategy ab-
stain would always give him a better payoff. Furthermore,
we have
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¼ B cs;PS  f ðM=NÞ þ c
¼ B hþ g  uPS  f ðM=NÞ þ c>
ðcÞ
B h
þ h B c þ f ðM=NÞ
maxiui
 uPS  f ðM=NÞ þ c ¼
ðdÞ
B h
þ h B c þ f ðM=NÞ
uPS
 uPS  f ðM=NÞ þ c ¼ 0;where (c) follows from the lower bound (2) and (d) from
uPS ¼maxiui . Summing up, we have thatuPS ;ðS;siÞ  uPS ;ðA;siÞ > 0 or uPS ;ðS;siÞ > uPS ;ðA;siÞProtocol 1: OREN
1: AllNE={sjs 2 NE}
2: if jAllNEj = 1 then
3: s*= getNext(AllNE)
4: else
5: G = OptNE(utilitarian, AllNE)
6: if jGj = 1 then
7: s*= getNext(G)
8: else
9: G = OptNE(egalitarian, AllNE)
10: if jGj = 1 then
11: s*= getNext(G)
12: else
13: if thisNodeID = initiatorID then
14: s*= InitiatorSelectOpt(G)
15: Broadcast(s*)
16: else
17: s*= ReceiveOpt(initiatorID)
18: end if
19: end if
20: end if
21: end if
Protocol 2: OptNE(ﬁrstOptCond,AllNE)
1: if ﬁrstOptCond=‘‘utilitarian’’ then
2: x1ðsÞ ¼
Pn
i¼0uiðsÞ
3: x2(s) = miniui(s)
4: else
5: x1(s) = miniui(s)
6: x2ðsÞ ¼
Pn
i¼0uiðsÞ
7: end if
8: G1 = {sjs = argmaxs2AllNE[x1(s)]}
9: if jG1j = 1 thenTherefore, PS has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from
his equilibrium strategy S.
In the end, no player is better off deviating from his
equilibrium strategy and thus s* is a Nash equilibrium in
any n-player revocation game Gn. h
6. Social welfare and protocols
In this section, we describe the method that we use to
select a single NE, in case more are present, with the re-
lated protocols. The underlying principle is that of the price
of anarchy [22], which takes into account the utility of all
players or, in other words, the social welfare function x.
There are different kinds of these functions and two among
them are the utilitarian and egalitarian functions:
Utilitarian : xðsÞ ¼
Xn
i¼0
uiðsÞ;
Egalitarian : xðsÞ ¼min
i
uiðsÞ:
By maximizing x(s) over all possible strategy proﬁles s =
(s1, . . . ,sn) 2 S, we achieve the social optimum welfare
Social Optimum ¼ max
s2S
xðsÞ:
The price of anarchy (PoA) is then deﬁned as the ratio of
the social optimum welfare to the welfare of the worst
NE strategy proﬁle s*
PoA ¼ Social Optimum
min
s2NE
xðsÞ :
The idea is that it gives a measure of how well selﬁsh play-
ers (NE) perform compared to the social optimum. To solve
the issue and help players make consistent decisions, i.e. to
select the same NE strategy, we use the notion of social
optimum but in a slightly different way. We do not try to
maximize the welfare function x over all possible proﬁles
s but only over the NE proﬁles s*, because we are interested
in selecting one NE that is optimal with respect to the gi-
ven x. Consequently, all players will be able to make inde-
pendent, but mutually consistent, decisions about a unique
NE.
We now describe the unique optimal NE selection pro-
tocol OREN that is run during the revocation process, as de-
scribed in Section 4.
First of all, each player computes all NE as the ﬁrst step
of the OREN protocol. Knowing the optimized gameparameters, nodes can use heuristics to immediately dis-
card all strategy combinations that do not result in a revo-
cation or that are inefﬁcient, thus reducing the time
required for the NE computations. If more than one NE ex-
ists, the second protocol OptNE is executed and the set G of
all NE satisfying the optimality criteria (utilitarian? egal-
itarian or vice versa) deﬁned by the variable ﬁrstOptCond is
determined. We choose the utilitarian criteria ﬁrst because
it compares the aggregate utilities of all players at once, as
opposed to the one-to-many comparison of each utility, for
all NE, done by the egalitarian criteria. The ﬁrst protocol
then looks whether this set is a singleton or not and if so,
it outputs the unique optimal NE proﬁle s*, otherwise it
changes the optimality criteria and restarts. If this process
ends up with G having more than one optimal NE as well,
the player that initiated the revocation game selects one
optimal NE from the set G at random and broadcasts it to
all participants. The ﬁnal output of the two protocols is
the unique socially optimal NE proﬁle s*. By agreeing on
this NE, all players are guaranteed not to pay the extra cost
c that would result from the failed revocation and to re-
ceive rewards from the CA.
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Protocol 2 (continued)
Protocol 2: OptNE(ﬁrstOptCond,AllNE)
10: G = G1
11: else
12: G2 ¼ fsjs ¼ argmaxs2G1 ½x2ðsÞg
13: G = G2
14: end if
15: return G
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(), InitiatorSelectOpt () chooses one element of () at ran-
dom, Broadcast() sends a broadcast message with the ele-
ment () to all neighbors and ReceiveOpt () waits for the
broadcasted element sent by the node with the () ID.
7. Performance evaluation
We implemented and simulated the optimal NE selec-
tion protocol OREN in Matlab, assuming a single attacker,
although there could be as many attackers as revocation
games running in parallel. We run 10 iterations for each
number of players between 2 and 15, as we assume a
highly mobile environment and short-range communica-
tions. The conﬁdence interval is 95%. As in Section 5.4 for
the system-wise efﬁciency of the self-sacriﬁce cost cs,i,
we assume here that b  v < e(M/N) in order to avoid any
unnecessary effort due to the use of the vote strategy as
well. The exact game parameters are:
 ui 2 ½0;10 uniformly at random, where we use the
same maximum value through all subsequent
simulations.
 h = 4.5 > B = 1 > c = 0.5 > v = 0.3 > b = 0.2 [certiﬁcates],
z = 0.25.
 g ¼ 2ðhBþf ðM=NÞÞc2maxiui is the middle point between the lower
(2) and upper bounds (3) to the slope of cs,i. The ratio of
malicious/total nodes is M/N = 0 and M/N = 0.3.
The main results are discussed in the following
subsections.
7.1. Number of Nash equilibria
In Fig. 3 we see that by using the dynamic vote, the
number of vote NE is only 1/25 of the number obtained
when using the majority vote for 15 players. This comes
from the fact that there are fewer combinations of players
whose aggregate votes would result in a successful revoca-
tion, compared to any combination of the majority of play-
ers in the other case. The impact of the presence of
colluding malicious nodes that could retaliate against the
players is negligible.
We notice that the number of self-sacriﬁce NE is the
same in both systems, because the self-sacriﬁce strategy
is limited to the one or two players that have the highest
counter and does not depend on the voting scheme being
used.7.2. Number of votes for revocation
Fig. 4 shows the number of players that are required to
vote in order to revoke the accused node’s certiﬁcate. For
the majority vote, the number of votes increases with the
total number of players, irrespective of their reputations.
With the dynamic vote, on the contrary, we see that the
number of votes tends to decrease as the number of play-
ers increases. Thanks to the greater diversity of counters as
the number of players increases, it becomes easier to ﬁnd
few players with high counters (or reputations), such that
the vote NE becomes socially less costly. If the game were
to end by voting, only these few players would need to
vote, compared to the greater number of players needed
by the majority and the consequently higher social cost.
7.3. Type of selected Nash equilibrium
Fig. 5 shows the percentage of vote NE that have been
selected as the unique optimal NE by the protocols for,
respectively, majority and dynamic votes. The percentage
of selected optimal self-sacriﬁce NE is simply the difference
between 100% and the vote NE selection percentage.
With majority votes, the vote NE is dominant in games
with less than 4 players, whereas with 4 players and more,
the self-sacriﬁce takes over. This is justiﬁed by the social
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than the sacriﬁce if and only if (b  v)  nv >c/2. For our
parameters, we have that the inequality holds if nv 6 2,
meaning that up to three players, a vote is less costly as
the majority is nv = 2, and afterwards it becomes more
costly and therefore the self-sacriﬁce strategy is selected.
With dynamic votes, we see that for relatively low um,
the vote NE is dominant with respect to the self-sacriﬁce
because very few players are needed to vote and, as ex-
plained earlier, the vote is more socially optimal if and only
if the two most wealthy players are sufﬁcient to revoke the
accused node. When um increases, more players would be
needed for the revocation by vote and if most of them have
a relatively low ui , it might not even be feasible. In this
case, the self-sacriﬁce strategy would be the only option.
Finally, we see that by increasing the number of players,
there are more chances of ﬁnding players with relatively
high ui and thus revocation by vote would be less costly
than self-sacriﬁce.
When the number of colluding malicious nodes in-
creases, the revocation is done by self-sacriﬁce. Given our
parameters, it is socially less costly to risk the revocation
of one benign node that committed self-sacriﬁce than
two devices that voted.
7.4. Optimality criteria
Fig. 6 shows the behavior of the revocation process with
respect to the optimality criteria that is chosen. OREN uses
two criteria for selecting the optimal NE: The utilitarian,
which maximizes the sum of individual payoffs, and the
egalitarian, which maximizes the minimum payoff among
the participants. Additionally, the initiator of the revoca-
tion has the ability to select one NE among the set of opti-
mal NE at the end of the computations, but only if several
equivalent such equilibria exist.
As it can be seen, when the accused node has a rela-
tively bad record of past behavior, i.e., a small um, there
are several optimal NE that can be selected at the end of
the revocation process. In this case, the initiator of the rev-
ocation process chooses one optimal NE (from the set of
optimal NE that has been identiﬁed by each participant
in the process) and instructs the other participants of thischoice. However, when the accused device has a relatively
good record of past behavior, i.e., a larger um, OREN ﬁnds
the unique optimal NE autonomously, facilitating the suc-
cessful revocation of the accused node in scenarios with
high node mobility and unreliable communications.
7.5. Duration of simulation
Fig. 7 shows the average duration of the OREN protocol
simulation, assuming that a dedicated hardware is avail-
able for the computations. This specialized hardware helps
reducing the total time of heterogeneous computations by
at least a factor of six [23] when compared to general pur-
pose CPUs (with a processing power similar to that of cur-
rent CPUs found on mobile devices). As it can be seen from
Fig. 7, by using dedicated hardware it would take at most
1.5 s (on average) to determine the unique optimal NE
for a revocation game with 10 players. Considering the
ephemeral network model under examination, this result
is satisfactory. However, as ﬁnding an optimal NE is hard
in general [21], further research might be required in order
to extend OREN to larger-scale networks.
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In this paper, we have designed a game-theoretic
framework for local certiﬁcate revocation in ephemeral
networks. First, the scheme makes use of incentives in or-
der to guarantee the revocation of the malicious node even
in presence of inaccurate estimation of the attack-induced
cost. Second, the scheme makes also use of reputations,
based on each node’s past behavior, and we have opti-
mized the game model such that the adapted cost param-
eters guarantee a successful revocation of the malicious
node in the most socially efﬁcient way.
Based on the analytical results, we have then designed a
novel reputation-based on-the-ﬂy local revocation scheme
that establishes a unique optimal Nash equilibrium in a
distributed fashion. Simulation results have illustrated
that, by considering the past behavior of all parties in-
volved in the process, our revocation protocols are effec-
tive in determining the unique most efﬁcient outcome
that is also socially optimal, i.e. that generates the least
costs for the community of players.
As part of future work, we intend to extend our game-
theoretic model to other breeds of networks with similar
characteristics, and to include role attribution to a subset
of players, where hierarchy and past behavior will be con-
sidered while determining the outcome of the revocation
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